



MAKING UK ASSISTANCE WORK IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

**Analysis of the UK's Changing Approach to supporting
Development and Humanitarian Emergencies in Fragile
& Conflict Affected States**

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Snapshot

Poverty and conflict are inextricably linked

- Poverty and conflict are widely understood to be intrinsically linked.¹
- A significant body of research shows that poverty increases conflict risk,² and once conflict breaks out, it hits the poorest the hardest.³
- Women and girls and marginalised communities are the worst affected by humanitarian crises.⁴
- Fragility and conflict also reverse hard-won development gains and stunt opportunities for women and girls, children, youth, and marginalised communities.⁵
- Within societies, Inequalities and poverty are important drivers of social exclusion, while conflict, social unrest and instability are its manifestation. Research indicates that inequality levels rise during conflict and can take decades to return to pre-conflict levels.⁶

Poverty is increasing in Fragile and Conflict Affected States, but declining everywhere else

- According to a list of classified states by the World Bank, there are 37 Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS), or “countries with high levels of institutional and social fragility” that are “affected by violent conflict.”⁷ By 2030, poverty is likely to have reduced significantly in non-fragile states, but extreme poverty in fragile states will have increased,⁸ with two-thirds of the world’s extreme poor living in these regions, half of which will be children.⁹

The UK has established a strong reputation as a development expert in engaging in FCAS over the last decade.

- The UK has established a strong reputation as a development expert in engaging in FCAS.
- The UK has leveraged considerable financial and political influence to support reducing poverty in conflict situations, and played a leading role on the international stage in leveraging strong commitments to FCAS.
- The UK uses Official Development Assistance (ODA) to respond to humanitarian emergencies, providing much needed humanitarian assistance. The UK has also used ODA to play an important part in reducing conflict and tackling the root causes of conflict

Recent changes in strategic focus and funding decisions continue to risk increasing existing fragilities in Fragile and Conflict Affected States, with warnings of further economic damage, regional instability and rises in violence.

- Recent data shows that the total UK bilateral ODA to Fragile and Conflict Affected States fell by 40% in 2021 from 2020 - a cut of £740 million.
- The proportion of FCDO bilateral ODA to Fragile and Conflict Affected States, which was 57% in 2017, fell from 54% in 2020 to 43% in 2021.
- Moreover, only 41% of the UK’s ‘priority countries’ in 2020 have a place on the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations list.
- Despite this high vulnerability, the more fragile a country is, the less ODA each resident living below the poverty line received.
 - For example, those living below the poverty line in fragile states received less FCDO ODA per person in 2021 than people living below the poverty line in non-Fragile States. People living below the poverty line in countries classified as ‘medium intensity conflict’ received on average 0.304 GBP of bilateral ODA, whereas people living below the poverty line in countries classified as ‘high institutional and social fragility’ received 0.68 GBP of bilateral ODA. In non-Fragile states, people living below the poverty line received 3.387 GBP of bilateral ODA per person.
- The cuts were not consultative or transparent, damaging hard-earned relationships with local actors. They were also at direct odds with previous commitments that prioritise the triple-nexus, and current Government objectives, such as the creation of the Conflict Strategic Framework.

¹Marks, Zoe. “Poverty and conflict.” GSDRC. October 2016:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5980670a40f0b61e4b00003e/Poverty-and-conflict_RP.pdf

²Murshed, Syed Mansoob. “The conflict-growth nexus and the poverty of nations”. July 2007:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23694223_The_conflict-growth_nexus_and_the_poverty_of_nations

³Marks, Zoe. “Poverty and conflict.” GSDRC. October 2016:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5980670a40f0b61e4b00003e/Poverty-and-conflict_RP.pdf

⁴IPPF. “Why are women and girls the worst affected by humanitarian crises?”. September 2021:

<https://www.ippf.org/blogs/why-are-women-and-girls-worst-affected-humanitarian-crises>

⁵Bousquet, Franck, Fernandez-Taranco, Oscar. “COVID-19 in Fragile Settings: Ensuring a Conflict-Sensitive Response” United Nations:

<https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/covid-19-fragile-settings-ensuring-conflict-sensitive-response>

⁶Dhliwayo, Rogers, Diarra,, Becaye, Odusola, Ayodele. “Inequality intensity and poverty drive conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.” UNDP. December 2017:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321627542_Inequality_intensity_and_poverty_drive_conflicts_in_sub-Saharan_Africa

⁷The World Bank. “Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.” Updated July 2022:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>

⁸Baier, Jasmin, Kristensen, Marina Buch, Davidsen, Soren. “Poverty and fragility: Where will the poor live in 2030?” Brookings. April 2021:

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030/>

⁹Ibid

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Introduction

It's more important than ever that the ODA budget be used to serve its purpose – to reduce poverty. We know that Poverty and conflict are widely understood to be intrinsically linked.¹⁰ We also know that poverty both increases the risk of conflict,¹¹ and also that once conflict breaks out, it hits the poorest the hardest¹² – in a vicious cycle. Women and girls and marginalised communities are the worst affected by humanitarian crises.¹³

Fragility and conflict also reverse hard-won development gains and stunt opportunities for women and girls, children, youth, and marginalised communities.¹⁴ Within societies, Inequalities and poverty are important drivers of social exclusion, while conflict, social unrest and instability are its manifestation. Research indicates that inequality levels rise during conflict and can take decades to return to pre-conflict levels.¹⁵

According to a list of classified states by the World Bank, there are 37 Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS), or “countries with high levels of institutional and social fragility” that are “affected by violent conflict.” By 2030, poverty is likely to have reduced significantly in non-fragile states, but extreme poverty in fragile states will have increased,¹⁷ with two-thirds of the world's extreme poor living in these regions, half of which will be children.¹⁸

The UK has leveraged considerable financial and political influence to support reducing poverty in conflict situations, using aid, or Official Development Assistance (ODA), to respond to humanitarian emergencies, providing much needed humanitarian assistance. The UK has also used ODA to play an important part in reducing conflict and tackling the root causes of conflict. As well as being a significant donor, the UK brought significant expertise in development to the table,¹⁹ and has played a leading role on the international stage in leveraging strong shared commitments to FCAS.

But recent changes in strategic focus and funding decisions continue to risk increasing existing fragilities in Fragile and Conflict Affected States, with warnings of further economic damage, regional instability and rises in violence.

In this report, research by Action For Humanity and The Advocacy Team looks at the volumes of ODA to FCAS, including analysis into the recent cuts to the UK's aid budget, alongside an analysis, it also outlines the UK government's political leadership on gender equality in FCAS over this period.

The increasing number and changing nature of conflicts, coupled with the growing concentration of people living in poverty in FCAS, exacerbated by climate change,²⁰ Covid-19,²¹ and inequality,²² means there is an urgent need to accelerate outcomes in these regions. Success is possible, and the UK must learn from and build on previous commitments. People in FCAS, including women, children and marginalised communities cannot wait.

This report identifies key recommendations for renewed effective engagement in FCAS, calling for strategies to be defined and delivered with a clear emphasis on poverty reduction.

¹⁰Marks, Zoe. “Poverty and conflict.” GSDRC. October 2016: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5980670a40f0b61e4b00003e/Poverty-and-conflict_RP.pdf

¹¹Murshed, Syed Mansoob. “The conflict-growth nexus and the poverty of nations”. July 2007: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23694223_The_conflict-growth_nexus_and_the_poverty_of_nations

¹²Marks, Zoe. “Poverty and conflict.” GSDRC. October 2016: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5980670a40f0b61e4b00003e/Poverty-and-conflict_RP.pdf

¹³IPPF. “Why are women and girls the worst affected by humanitarian crises?”. September 2021: <https://www.ippf.org/blogs/why-are-women-and-girls-worst-affected-humanitarian-crises>

¹⁴Bousquet, Franck, Fernandez-Taranco, Oscar. “COVID-19 in Fragile Settings: Ensuring a Conflict-Sensitive Response” United Nations: <https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/covid-19-fragile-settings-ensuring-conflict-sensitive-response>

¹⁵Dhliwayo, Rogers, Diarra,, Becaye, Odusola, Ayodele. “Inequality intensity and poverty drive conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.” UNDP. December 2017: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321627542_Inequality_intensity_and_poverty_drive_conflicts_in_sub-Saharan_Africa

¹⁶The World Bank. “Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.” Updated July 2022: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>

¹⁷Baier, Jasmin, Kristensen, Marina Buch, Davidsen, Soren. “Poverty and fragility: Where will the poor live in 2030?” Brookings. April 2021: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030/>

¹⁸Ibid

¹⁹Care, UK LEADERSHIP ON GENDER EQUALITY GLOBALLY Learning from past lessons on where the UK should invest for women and girls”, Care International, March, 2022, https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/attachments/Policy_briefing_-_UK_leadership_on_gender_equality_globally.pdf

²⁰United Nations Climate Change. “Conflict and Climate Change.” July 2022: <https://unfccc.int/blog/conflict-and-climate>

²¹Bricknell, Martin. “New analyses shows COVID-19 pandemic could exacerbate existing conflicts and trigger new flashpoints.” Kings College London. June 2021: <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/new-analyses-shows-covid-19-pandemic-could-exacerbate-existing-conflicts-and-trigger-new-flashpoints>

²²Dhliwayo, Rogers, Diarra,, Becaye, Odusola, Ayodele. “Inequality intensity and poverty drive conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.” UNDP. December 2017: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321627542_Inequality_intensity_and_poverty_drive_conflicts_in_sub-Saharan_Africa

Executive Summary

The UK has historically seen the value in engaging in FCAS, and influenced other governments and donors to follow suit. As well as being the first country to enshrine commitments to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA into law, the UK made bold political²³ and financial commitments - including committing 50% of bi-lateral DFID spend in 2015²⁴ - to FCAS.

Alongside humanitarian assistance, UK ODA also played an important part in reducing and addressing the root causes of conflict. The UK adopted bold policy and international frameworks designed for advancement in FCAS. Cohesive policy and action across UK foreign policy and development positioned the UK as a trusted development partner in FCAS, with 'ending global poverty' at the heart of strategic thinking.²⁵ Whilst these pledges did not consistently translate into direct impact, these commitments and this expertise is increasingly vital as the nature of conflict evolves and as humanitarian needs continue to grow.

But this engagement has shifted as the UK adapted to institutional and economic changes, increasingly complex conflict situations, geopolitical uncertainty, and a shift in the UK's place within the international community.

Political and economic pressures over the past few years have led to refocusing of priority countries and reduction in fragile states expenditure. This was at direct odds with growing levels of poverty, and saw FCAS receive less ODA per capita than their poverty levels justify.²⁶ In the 2021 Integrated Review (IR) the commitment to focus half of UK aid on FCAS was removed²⁷ to facilitate the redirection of aid to countries deemed more strategically valuable and more likely to increase the UK's global influence.²⁸ The primary section on 'Conflict and instability' within the IR also changed. Where it had previously been viewed through a development lens, it was moved to sit within the framework of 'Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas,' a framing that experts argued marked a shift towards a security focus.

These decisions preceded several other government announcements relating to international development, including the merger of the Department for International Development DFID with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) to form the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), which was described as a 'fundamentally political decision, intended to subordinate development and the objective of global poverty reduction.'³⁰ The Government also announced the current reduction in the UK's ODA from 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.5% in 2020.³¹

The cuts to UK development assistance continue to risk increasing existing fragilities in Fragile and Conflict Affected States, with warnings of further economic damage, regional instability and rises in violence.

Shifts in priorities are at odds with growing levels of poverty. Recent data shows that the total UK bilateral ODA to FCAS fell by 40% in 2021 from 2020 - a cut of £740 million. The proportion of FCDO bilateral ODA to Fragile and Conflict Affected States fell from 54% in 2020 to 43% in 2021, where it was 57%.³² Moreover, despite this high vulnerability, the more fragile a country is, the less ODA each resident living below the poverty line received.

²³Ministry of Defence, "Building Stability Overseas Strategy", Asset Publishing Service, July 1, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

²⁴Cameron, David. "Lord Mayor's Banquet 2015: Prime Minister's speech", Gov.uk, November 16, 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2015-prime-ministers-speech>

²⁵Mitchell, Andrew. "We can end global poverty", Conservative Home, April 18 2010, <https://conservativehome.com/2010/04/18/andrew-mitchell-we-can-end-global-poverty/>

²⁶Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy", Gov.uk, July 2, 2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy>

²⁷Starling, Simon. "Following the money: what do the aid cuts tell us about government's new approach?", BOND, July 1, 2021, <https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2021/07/following-the-money-what-do-the-aid-cuts-tell-us-about-governments-new-approach/>

²⁸Devanny, Joe. "The Conservative Party and DFID: party starcraft and development policy since 1997", Contemporary British History Volume 36, Issue 1 (2022), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13619462.2021.1969232>

²⁹The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

³⁰Devanny, Joe. "The Conservative Party and DFID: party starcraft and development policy since 1997", Contemporary British History Volume 36, Issue 1 (2022), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13619462.2021.1969232>

³¹Worley, Will. "Tracking the UK's controversial aid cuts", devex, November 25, 2022, <https://www.devex.com/news/tracking-the-uk-s-controversial-aid-cuts-99883>

³²Ibid

Inconsistencies in strategy and ODA spend have damaged hard-earned partnerships with development partners, and failed to mention conflict sensitivity.³³ The cuts, by their very nature, favoured short-term stability over the longer-term investment needed for peacebuilding. They were also at direct odds with previous Government commitments to coordinate development and diplomacy in a way that promotes 'structural stability' and 'resilience', and that puts poverty reduction and long-term peacebuilding as its primary goal,³⁴ and other Government commitments more broadly. These actions all signal a shift away from commitments to tackle the long-term drivers of conflict.

Latest figures also show another stark finding; for the first time ever, hosting refugees in the UK became the biggest sector for ODA spending in 2021. This came at the expense of all other programs, including humanitarian support, health, and education and prohibits the government from achieving broader commitments to these thematic areas. Supporting refugees in the UK is vital, but domestic costs must not come at the expense of marginalised communities around the world. This preference for short-term stability over longer-term solutions needed for peacebuilding is counter-productive because investing in conflict prevention, conflict reduction and peacebuilding reduces uncertainty in the international peace and security landscape and reduces threats to the UK from this kind of instability.³⁵

The International Development Strategy (IDS), published in May 2022, saw the removal of specific commitments to FCAS and a tilt towards the response to conflict in Ukraine. The UK's response to the Ukraine situation, which is likely to skew spending figures in 2022, demonstrates how the UK can deliver for FCAS in times of crisis, from opening the borders under the 'homes for Ukraine scheme',³⁶ to showing solidarity and financial generosity, with commitments of £2.3bn in 2022.³⁷ However, this response is unprecedented and not how the UK always approaches international protection.

The war in Ukraine is also placing further stresses on areas that were already FCAS. With funding for other humanitarian and displacement crises falling far behind Ukraine, the UK must distribute ODA equitably across regions, and demonstrate the same level of solidarity, non-discrimination, protection, and political support shown the Ukraine response for all those escaping conflicts, violence, persecution, and human rights violations.

As of November 2022, UK aid is set to remain "around" 0.5%, despite more and more of it going towards the Home Office's UK refugee hosting costs. This means more cuts to programmes around the world.³⁸ In a statement made in November 2022, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly committed to being more transparent about ODA spend, work closely with delivery partners, and listen to and engage with people in developing countries. The Foreign Secretary also committed to maximise value for money of ODA across Government, and deliver greater reliability to partners by strengthening ODA governance arrangements. These steps will go some way to building trust with partners,³⁹ but for effective engagement in FCAS, the UK must go further.

Against the backdrop of another round of cuts to the International Development budget, as is referenced in a statement from the International Development Committee (IDC),⁴⁰ The UK must commit to using the remainder of the budget to serve its purpose, to reach the communities in the greatest need by renewing commitments to FCAS. Central to this is the understanding that all countries are unique, and hence country context and a robust situation analysis are essential to making decisions.

³³BOND. "The International Development Strategy; A Rapid Assessment". 2022:

<https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2022/05/the-international-development-strategy-a-rapid-assessment/>

³⁴Conflict Resources, "Investing in long-term peace? The new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund", Conflict Resources, September, 2014, https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Joint%20SW_CR_IA%20briefing%20on%20CP%20CSSF%20BSOS%20-%20FINAL0914.pdf

³⁵The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

³⁶GOV.UK. "Homes For Ukraine." March 2022:

<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/homes-for-ukraine-sponsor-guidance>

³⁷Truss, Liz. "UK will match record Ukraine support in 2023", Gov.uk, September 20, 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-will-match-record-ukraine-support-in-2023>

³⁸Rumford, Helen. "What's been happening to UK aid this week? Cuts, cuts and more cuts", BOND, November 24, 2022, <https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2022/11/whats-been-happening-to-uk-aid-this-week-cuts-cuts-and-more-cuts/>

³⁹Cleverly, James. "FCDO Update", UK Parliament, November 22, 2022,

<https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2022-11-22/hcws379>

⁴⁰UK Parliament, "Chair responds to statements made by Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly MP", Parliament Committees, November 22, 2022,

<https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/98/international-development-committee/news/174612/chair-responds-to-statement-made-by-foreign-secretary-james-cleverly-mp/>

Recommendations

As the UK decides on the distribution of planned ODA allocations over the remainder of the Spending Review and publishes the next Integrated Review, it must reaffirm and strengthen the focus of UK ODA on tackling poverty. The UK will be able to end poverty only through a focus on fragile and conflict affected states. The return to scaled up funding in these environments is, therefore, imperative.

In the Integrated Review

- **Poverty reduction:** Reaffirm and strengthen the focus of UK ODA on poverty reduction. Reset the priority countries within the IR with a need-based approach that prioritises FCAS: The UK must also conduct an equalities assessment to make judgements about further funding decisions.
- **Partnerships with Local Actors:** Strengthen the UK's engagements with, and support to, locally-led efforts to prevent and respond to conflict. UK funding and cooperation with partners should be based on an equal partnership. There should be transparency and consultation with partners over any further cuts to the ODA budget.
- **Conflict and gender sensitivity:** All UK ODA to FCAS should be conflict-sensitive. This includes monitoring changing dynamics and acting on conflict sensitivity risks from the outset of any programmes.
- **Cohesive policy and action across UK foreign policy and development:** Ensure a whole of government response that works collectively towards a sustainable approach to international peace and security.

In the Spending Review

- **Reinstate previous commitments to FCAS:** Ensure that 50% of FCDO ODA funding goes to fragile and conflict-affected states and ensure that ODA is used for longer-term efforts to address root causes of conflict.
- **Prioritise Women & Girls and marginalised communities:** The UK committed to reversing the funding cuts for women and girls.⁴¹ It must now lay out plans to reinstate this budget. Funding should go directly to CSOs and NGOs working on the frontlines in fragile contexts, including women-led, women's rights and local organisations who lead in crisis.
- **Flexible multi-year funding that can respond to conflict dynamics:** Immediate humanitarian assistance is vital, but to be effective, the UK must also revert back to, and build on commitments that support and deliver long-term activity to prevent instability and conflicts and allow local actors to adapt quickly to changing dynamics.

⁴¹Truss, Liz. "I want to ensure no country can ever again use sexual violence as a weapon of war." Inews. November 2021: <https://inews.co.uk/opinion/liz-truss-i-want-to-ensure-no-country-can-ever-again-use-sexual-violence-as-a-weapon-of-war-1301907>

Definitions of Fragile & Conflict Affected States

There is no universal definition of FCAS and no fixed list of fragile states.⁴² There are a number of different frameworks and indices available for assessing fragility and risk of conflict, each of which focus on different aspects of fragility leading to conflict. The UK used the acronym FCAS to refer to both states that fit within the state-focused definition above, and fragile and conflict-affected situations more generally. It highlighted that a fragile and conflict-affected situation can exist within an otherwise stable state or regionally - affecting one or more states.⁴³

In 2015, DFID released a fragile states list which was based on objective data on state stability from a range of assessment frameworks.⁴⁴ DFID's list was updated again in 2017.⁴⁵ These lists were comprised using a combination of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)⁴⁶ indicators, the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index (FSI)⁴⁷ and the Uppsala Conflict Database. The World Bank, especially, provided an internationally recognised framework, so the UK's decision to create its own list was interesting. For example, the DFID list was considered to be long because it included all DFID spend in countries on DFID's list of fragile states and all DFID spend in ODA-eligible countries neighbouring 'high fragility' states. The inclusion of neighbouring states is right, but it was recognised that there was a lack of clear guidance on allocations of bilateral resources between the countries.⁴⁸

Moreover, despite claiming that DFID's fragile states list would be reviewed annually to accommodate for fluctuations in fluidity.⁴⁹ As of the time of publishing, there has been no updated list of FCAS from the UK Government to use as a benchmark since 2017. This paper will therefore base its analysis on the the World Bank's 'Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations'.⁵⁰ This analysis will match the list from fiscal years with corresponding UK ODA data. The inclusion of any analysis that uses data from DFID's list will be signposted explicitly.

The commitment to spend 50% of DFID's budget on 'Fragile States and Regions' was outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review and UK Aid Strategy.⁵¹ The indicator measures the proportion of DFID's budget (including DFID's share of cross government funds) spent on ODA in FCAS, per calendar year. The technical definition of FCAS outlined that the indicator would consider all DFID spend in countries on DFID's list of fragile states, as well as neighbouring 'high fragility' states.⁵²

⁴²International Monetary Fund, "The IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States", IMF eLibrary, March 14, 2022, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/007/2022/004/article-A001-en.xml#ref_A001ref14

⁴³Department for International Development, "Results in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations" Assets Publishing Service, February 28, 2012, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67437/managing-results-conflict-affected-fragile-states.pdf

⁴⁴Dairymple, Sarah. "Does DFID's new fragile states list point towards a shift in funding allocation", Development Initiatives, February 16, 2016, <https://devinit.org/blog/does-dfids-new-fragile-states-list-point-towards-a-shift-in-funding-allocation/>

⁴⁵GOV UK. "Methodology Note Fragile and Conflict Affected Regions. Updated 2017: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722389/Methodology-Note-Fragile-and-conflict-affected-states-and-regions.pdf

⁴⁶The World Bank, "CPIA policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average (1=low to 6=high)", The World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.SOCI.XQ>

⁴⁷Fund For Peace, <https://fundforpeace.org>

⁴⁸Dairymple, Sarah. "Does DFID's new fragile states list point towards a shift in funding allocations". Development Initiatives. February 2016: <https://devinit.org/blog/does-dfids-new-fragile-states-list-point-towards-a-shift-in-funding-allocation/>

⁴⁹https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722389/Methodology-Note-Fragile-and-conflict-affected-states-and-regions.pdf

⁵⁰The World Bank, "Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations", The World Bank, July 1, 2022, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>

⁵¹https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722389/Methodology-Note-Fragile-and-conflict-affected-states-and-regions.pdf


⁵²This equates to countries that neighbour at least one state categorised as 'high fragility' in DFID's list of fragile states, which are ODA eligible and where regional instability and DFID funding may have a substantial impact.

Why UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected States is Critical in a Changing World

Despite the changing nature of conflicts - which includes both a greater number of conflicts within national borders in which external international actors are involved and a wider range of international actors, both state and non-state, are involved - many familiar drivers of conflict still lay the root of the issues in FCAS. These issues include, but are not limited to, political, social and economic inequalities, non-inclusive governance, historic grievances and the legacies of past conflict.⁵³

Half of the world's poorest people live in fragile or conflict-affected countries. By 2030, up to two thirds of people living in extreme poverty are projected to be living in FCAS

Despite the fact that more than one billion people lifted themselves out of extreme poverty over the last 25 years,⁵⁴ the number of people in absolute poverty in FCAS is increasing. These states are home to almost 1 billion people, 335 million of which lived in extreme poverty in 2020. As non-FCAS inch closer out of poverty, in FCAS there will be a growing number of people in extreme poverty. Indeed, by 2030, it is expected that there will be 359 million people living in extreme poverty in today's fragile states, representing 63 percent of the world's poor.⁵⁵



They are also the countries driving the global displacement crisis, accounting for 88% of all internal displacement and 84% of all refugees in 2019.⁵⁶ Out of the 155 million people who are acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance, two-thirds live in FCAS such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, or Yemen.⁵⁷

⁵³The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

⁵⁴Lecq, Barbara, Wyatt, Matthew. "What people want: building resilience and stability in conflict and crises", Development Initiatives, June 4, 2019, <https://devinit.org/blog/people-want-building-resilience-stability-conflict-crises/>

⁵⁴Baier, Jasmin, Kristensen, Marina Buch, Davidsen, Soren. "Poverty and fragility: Where will the poor live in 2030?" Brookings. April 2021: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030/>

⁵⁵Baier, Jasmin, Kristensen, Marina Buch, Davidsen, Soren. "Poverty and fragility: Where will the poor live in 2030?" Brookings. April 2021: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030/>

⁵⁶Rescue UK. "2022 Emergency Watchlist." December 2021: <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/6423/cs2201watchlistreportfinal.pdf>

⁵⁷International Monetary Fund, "The IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States", IMF eLibrary, March 14, 2022, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/007/2022/004/article-A001-en.xml#ref_A001ref14

Conflict has been recognised as a key impediment to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

Commitments to conflict related engagement in FCAS is vital for improving sustainable development outcomes for people in FCAS. Conflict is the biggest obstacle to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is directly true in relation to reducing conflict related deaths, and with development outcomes that are aligned with the SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions – of which the UK has been a champion.⁵⁸ However, it is also vital for achieving the other SDGs more broadly. Conflict has a staggering impact on development outcomes including poverty reduction, gender, health, inequalities, education and economic opportunity.

Conflict and fragility impedes efforts to promote peace and security

There is a strong case for investing UK ODA in tackling the root causes of violent conflict through peacebuilding and conflict prevention approaches. Investment in development in FCAS makes us all safer and helps save the future economic costs of conflict.⁵⁹ Indeed, the global cost of conflict was estimated to be 14.5 trillion USD in 2019, or an estimated 10.6% of global GDP.⁶⁰

As well as immediate humanitarian response, UK aid can be conducive for humanitarian and development assistance that is effective and cost efficient in FCAS.⁶¹ It can also be invested in peacebuilding tools, such as early warning systems and local systems to manage and transform conflict before it escalates into widespread violence and saves lives.⁶² Conflict prevention and resolution boils down to long-term commitment. As Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen have demonstrated, today's conflicts are increasingly protracted and complex.⁶³ Peacebuilding can also help address barriers to access to education for girls and young women, including inter community tensions.⁶⁴

Women and girls and marginalised communities are disproportionately impacted in conflict

Displaced communities, in particular women and girls, are disproportionately affected in crisis. Indeed, identity-based targeting and marginalisation can act as a precursor to violence, even outside of conflict.⁶⁵ For instance, gender-based violence is exacerbated in conflict with the weakening of family networks.⁶⁶ Women and girls also represent over 70% of people facing chronic hunger.⁶⁷ Nearly 320 million children live in fragile or conflict-affected states, and 46% of these children are out of school.⁶⁸ In addition, the proportion of people living with HIV is four times greater and the malaria mortality rate 13 times greater in fragile states than in other developing countries.

Conflict is the persistent driver of humanitarian crises in FCAS, but they are also among the countries most vulnerable to climate change

Climate change often hits the hardest and is felt most profoundly in fragile and conflict-affected settings, which suffer from high vulnerability and low investments in coping capacity and adaptation.⁶⁹

⁵⁸The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

⁵⁹The One Campaign. "Britain's Greatest Export: Making the UK a 21st Century Global Development Leader". https://cdn.one.org/pdfs/Britains_Greatest_Export.pdf

⁶⁰Ibid

⁶¹Vrbensky, Rastislav. "Can development prevent conflict? Integrated area-based development in the Western Balkans – theory, practice and policy recommendations", London School of Economics, April 14, 2009, <https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23360/1/WP02.pdf>

⁶²Defontaine, Catherine. "Setting up early warning and response systems to prevent violent conflicts and save lives", World Bank Blogs, February 15, 2019, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/setting-early-warning-and-response-systems-prevent-violent-conflicts-and-save-lives>

⁶³Mitchell, Jon. "A force for good: how the UK can lead in shaping a more just and peaceful world", ODI, <https://odi.org/en/insights/a-force-for-good-how-the-uk-can-lead-in-shaping-a-more-just-and-peaceful-world/>

⁶⁴El-Bushra, Judy, Smith, Emilie Rees. "Gender, Education and Peacebuilding A review of selected Learning for Peace case studies", June, 2016, Early Childhood Peace Consortium, https://ecdpeace.org/sites/default/files/pdf/01-31_Gender_PeaceBuildingCaseStudies-SPREADS-PRINT.pdf

⁶⁵<https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/43504/html/>

⁶⁶Hendessi, Mandana, Higelin, Michelle. "A feminist approach to safe spaces for women & girls in humanitarian response", ActionAid, September 6, 2019: https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/a-feminist-approach-to-safe-spaces-for-women-and-girls-in-humanitarian-response-action-aid-uk-publication_0.pdf

⁶⁷Rescue UK. "2022 Emergency Watchlist." December 2021: <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/6423/cs2201watchlistreportfinal.pdf>

⁶⁸Keith, Regina. "Unlocking Progress in Fragile States", ResearchGate, October, 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328175513_Unlocking_Progress_in_Fragile_States

⁶⁹Cao, Yu, Wong, Catherine, "How can climate finance work better for fragile and conflict affected states". UNDP. February 2022: <https://www.preventionweb.net/news/how-can-climate-finance-work-better-fragile-and-conflict-affected-regions>

According to the The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change is a 'threat multiplier' that contributes to conflict and instability.⁷⁰ This is because countries enduring conflict are already weakened by conflict and are therefore less able to adapt to the effects of climate change. Of the 25 countries deemed most vulnerable to climate change, 14 are enduring ongoing conflict.⁷¹

The IPCC report does not go as far as to say that climate change is a direct driver of conflict, however there is agreement that the risk of conflict and global insecurity is indirectly exacerbated. There is evidence that factors like socio-economic conditions, governance, and political factors interact and play a key role in translating climate change into conflict risks, including with links to water security and food security. Climate related disasters are also a growing driver of migration and displacement.⁷²

Moving away from fragility takes time

Moving a fragile state towards a threshold of 'good enough' governance takes a striking amount of time. It took the 20 fastest moving countries an average of 17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality and 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control. These average timescales refer to reaching a point of adequacy. Reaching a place of best practice in terms of governance would likely take longer. Moreover, the benchmarks for the 'fastest transformers' referred to are Portugal and Korea. These states both started from much more favourable conditions than those experienced by the FCAS today.⁷³

The UK has been at the forefront of work in FCAS for over a decade

Work in FCAS has been central to the UK government's international development approach since 2010. As well as financial commitments, the UK also developed and honed a range of other tools for engagement in FCAS, including Diplomacy, Sanctions, Peacemaking and political settlements, Peacebuilding, trade and private sector and military engagement, all of which fall under different parts of HMG.⁷⁴

Tackling structural drivers of conflict including poverty and inequality in FCAS

The UK Government, along with other Governments across the world,⁷⁵ have historically shown a tendency to make decisions driven by counter-terrorism objectives and an increasing interest in stemming the source of potential refugee and migrant flows.⁷⁶ However, even within the context of the largest-ever peacetime deficit in 2010,⁷⁷ International Development Minister, Andrew Mitchell argued that the government would 'not balance the books on the backs of the poorest people in the world.'⁷⁸ This stood to highlight a focus on reducing poverty as per the 2002 Development Act, which states that the provision of the assistance should be 'likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.'⁷⁹

70IPCC, "Global Warming of 1.5C", IPCC, 2018,

https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf

71ICRC, "Seven things you need to know about climate change and conflict", ICRC, July 9, 2022,

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/climate-change-and-conflict?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&linkId=10000059949431

72<https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/what-does-ipcc-report-tell-us-about-climate-and-conflict>

73ICAI. "Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID's support to fragile states". 2015:

<https://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

74The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021,

<https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

75Reuters, "USAID to grant \$115 mln in aid to El Salvador to stem migration", REUTERS, June 15, 2021,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/usaid-grant-115-mln-aid-el-salvador-stem-migration-2021-06-15/>

76Mitchell, Andrew. "We can end global poverty", Conservative Home, April 18 2010,

<https://conservativehome.com/2010/04/18/andrew-mitchell-we-can-end-global-poverty/>

77Devanny, Joe. "The Conservative Party and DFID: party starcraft and development policy since 1997", Contemporary British History Volume 36, Issue 1 (2022),

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13619462.2021.1969232>

78Davison, John. "A conversation with Andrew Mitchell on UK aid reform", devex, October 19, 2010,

<https://www.devex.com/news/a-conversation-with-andrew-mitchell-on-uk-aid-reform-70380>

79UK Parliament, "International Development Act 2002: Part 1", legislation.gov.uk, June 17, 2022,

<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/part/1>

The UK Government has argued that ODA should be used to fund programmes that address the drivers of conflict and instability by “tackling corruption, promoting good governance, improving access to security and justice, and inclusive economic development.”⁸⁰ In particular, programmes that support Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels)⁸¹ relate to conflict prevention.

It was also well acknowledged by the UK government from 2010–2019 that delivering results in FCAS was fundamental to the Department For International Development’s (DFID) ability to deliver on its commitment to poverty reduction.⁸² Strategies like the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS),⁸³ the National Security Strategy (NSS)⁸⁴ and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)⁸⁵ recognised the need to deal with the root causes of conflict. Humanitarian Assistance should be ‘delivered on the basis of need alone and on the basis of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in accordance with its key international commitments’,⁸⁶ and a nexus-based approach should be taken, with commitments to ensure that the ‘transition from humanitarian response to longer-term support lays the foundations for future stability and development’.⁸⁷

Scaled-up, flexible and multi-year funding to address the root cause of conflict and support the people affected by it

The UK’s rhetoric on funding to FCAS reflected the need to respond to the unpredictability of FCAS by providing funding for programmes with greater inbuilt flexibility. For example, DFID country offices in fragile states planned and delivered transformational activities.⁸⁸ It was critiqued at the time that these were harder-to-measure and would show results only in the longer term, but in our view, building resilience, through multi-year flexible funding is the right approach’.⁸⁹ Engaging in fragile and conflict-affected states inevitably involves risk to address challenges such as poor security, weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, or violence.⁹⁰

Nevertheless, the UK set the standard for other stakeholders to follow. It was the first G7 donor to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on ODA in 2013, increasing spending from £8,766 billion in 2012 to £11,437 billion in 2013, and in 2015 became the first G7 nation to enshrine the international ODA commitment in law.⁹¹ This was sustained in 2014 and 2015, with figures of 0.72 percent or £12.24 billion.⁹² In 2015, within the context of the UK Government Spending Review and new UK Aid Strategy, the UK committed to ‘allocate 50% of DFID’s budget to fragile states and regions in every year of this Parliament’.⁹³ This commitment was made after analysis showed that in 2014, 54% of DFID’s bilateral funding was spent in 64 FCAS, exceeding the 50% target.⁹⁴ It also committed to play an active role in influencing the international community and help multilateral financial institutions review experience with different approaches to fragile states. Historically, the size of the UK’s ODA contribution has been significant when compared to other donors in many countries.

⁸⁰Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “UK approach to preventing mass atrocities”, gov.uk, July 16, 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities>

⁸¹Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Sustainable Development, “Goal 16”, United Nations, <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16>

⁸²DFID, “Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi”, Parliament.uk, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/writev/conflict/co01.htm>

⁸³Ministry of Defence, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, Asset Publishing Service, July 1, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

⁸⁴Cabinet Office, “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy”, Asset Publishing Service, October 18, 2020, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015>

⁸⁵Cabinet Office, “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy”, Asset Publishing Service, October 18, 2020, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015>

⁸⁶Ministry of Defence, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, Asset Publishing Service, July 1, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

⁸⁷Ministry of Defence, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, Asset Publishing Service, July 1, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

⁸⁸ICAI, “Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID’s support to fragile states”. 2015: <https://icaei.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

⁸⁹Ibid

⁹⁰OECD, “Development Assistance and Approaches to Risk in Fragile and Conflict Affected States”. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/2014-10-30%20Approaches%20to%20Risk%20FINAL.pdf>


⁹¹Care, UK LEADERSHIP ON GENDER EQUALITY GLOBALLY Learning from past lessons on where the UK should invest for women and girls”, Care International, March, 2022, https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/attachments/Policy_briefing_-_UK_leadership_on_gender_equality_globally.pdf

⁹²Heppell, Timothy. “The UK government and the 0.7% international aid target: Opinion among Conservative parliamentarians”, White Rose, September 6, 2017, <https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121346/11/BJPIR%20Resubmitted%20Draft%20paper.pdf>

⁹³Department of International Development, “UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest”, Asset Publishing Service, November, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf

⁹⁴Dalrymple, Sarah. “Does DFID’s new fragile states list point towards a shift in funding allocation?”, Development Initiatives, February 16, 2016, <https://devinit.org/blog/does-dfid-s-new-fragile-states-list-point-towards-a-shift-in-funding-allocation/>

Since 2016, the UK has spent approximately one third of ODA through multilaterals,⁹⁵ which may offer improved coordination with other international partners, but this comes at the expense of the UK building its own partnerships with local actors in-country. The International Development strategy, published in May 2022,⁹⁶ referenced a shift from multilateral to bilateral engagement, which offers the opportunity to build local partnerships. Whilst engagement with multilaterals is important, the UK must find ways to support smaller, local actors.



Partnerships with local actors who play a vital role in conflict transformation and sustaining peace

The UK played a role in championing localisation, as well as highlighting the link between gender and conflict through its National Action Plans. DFID’s 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) acknowledged the crucial role equal partnerships with local actors play as first responders in times of crisis. HERR concluded that it is more costly to not undertake the process of localisation as local capacities are not utilised, local communities are not involved in the response and the delivery is of lower quality. The accreditation of localisation in HERR led to the UK being a major contributor to discussions on localisation at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.⁹⁷

Despite the rhetoric, analysis of OECD-DAC figures indicated that in 2018 the UK only disbursed 3.8% of the total ODA budget under the OECD-DAC “Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution” coding.⁹⁸ Funding models need to enable local actors to take a prominent role in long-term peace efforts. This demonstrates how, despite the commitments from successive governments to respond to conflict and peacebuild, it does not consistently translate into impact.

⁹⁵Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “Statistics on International Development: final UK aid spend 2020”, Gov.uk, June 8, 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2020/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2020>

⁹⁶Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “The UK government’s strategy for international development”, Gov.uk, May 16, 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-governments-strategy-for-international-development/the-uk-governments-strategy-for-international-development>

⁹⁷Ager, Alastair and Goodwin, Ellen. “Localisation in the Context of UK Government Engagement With the Humanitarian Reform Agenda”, *Frontiers*, September 17, 2021, <https://eresearch.qmu.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/20.500.12289/11520/11520.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>

⁹⁸Parliament Committees, “Bond Conflict Policy Group (CPG) Submission on International Development Select Committee inquiry on the effectiveness of UK aid”, Parliament Committees, May, 2020, <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/4111/html/>

At the Forefront of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

The UK has been at the forefront of Women Peace and Security (WPS). It was only the second country to issue a National Action Plan (NAP) (2018–2022)', which offered a gender-sensitive and inclusive integrated framework for conflict prevention and resolution.⁹⁹ This leadership role is reflected in an array of positions, such as in the role of 'penholder' on WPS resolutions, a series of dedicated initiatives on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and in the provision of resources for major WPS entities like UN Women.¹⁰⁰

The NAP identified 7 strategic outcomes, including several that prioritise women's inclusive leadership. These included increasing women's meaningful and representative participation in decision making processes (i.e. in conflict prevention), needs-based and meaningful leadership in humanitarian response, and the leadership of women in developing strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism.¹⁰¹

In practice, the UK implemented a wide range of programmatic interventions that prioritised women's leadership in FCAS, including in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, which were identified as priority countries in the NAP.¹⁰² For example, in Afghanistan, the UK led a programme that sought to address the issue of sexual violence and support survivors through improving access to justice and supporting the work of human rights defenders.¹⁰³

Building Resilience in FCAS

Disaster resilience was presented as 'a new and vital component [of our] humanitarian and development work' in the UK's 2011 Government Response to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR).¹⁰⁴ Building on this, the Humanitarian Policy, Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience, centres resilience as a core approach to disaster response, both natural and man-made. Commitments were made to prioritise resilience-building in all DFID country programmes by 2015, as well as integrate resilience into DFID's work on climate response, conflict prevention, humanitarian response, and development work.

Moving towards a conflict sensitive approach

The 'UK' was establishing itself as a thought leader in conflict sensitivity - an approach to delivering international assistance in a way that recognises and responds to the potential of those activities to impact, and be impacted by, peace and conflict.¹⁰⁵ Through the CSSF and the Peaceful Change Initiative, tools and processes were delivered to review for conflict sensitivity which would largely have at a project level (as opposed to a policy level) in other activities.¹⁰⁶ In Yemen, for example, the UK's support for the Conflict Sensitivity Platform provides critical conflict sensitivity expertise to increase the effectiveness of aid interventions by a wide range of international and local actors, with exponential impact on the effectiveness of all these other international efforts to support peace in Yemen.

ICAI reported good evidence that the 'Do No Harm' principle was considered in DFID's programme design, especially in more difficult environments. That said the principle was not always monitored in a systematic way during programme implementation. This heightened the risk of DFID increasing tensions and causing damage though such community-based programmes operating in the midst of communities in conflict.¹⁰⁷

⁹⁹Ibid

¹⁰⁰Kirby, Paul, Swaine, Aisling, Wright, Hannah. "The Future of the UK's Women, Peace and Security Policy". LSE. 2022:

<https://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2022/W922-0167-WPS-Policy-Paper-7-V4-SINGLES.pdf>

¹⁰¹GOV UK. "UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security 2018 - 2022". 2018:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1022064/FC01215-NAP-Women-Peace-Security-ONLINE_V2.pdf

¹⁰²Ibid

¹⁰³Ibid

¹⁰⁴DFID. "Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper". 2011:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/186874/defining-disaster-resilience-approach-paper.pdf

¹⁰⁵The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹⁰⁶The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ICAI. "Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID's support to fragile states". 2015:

<https://ica.i-independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

Leading in the coordination and strategic prioritisation of international assistance in FCAS

Whilst it is important to acknowledge that leadership should be locally led, the UK's commitments and leadership allowed for significant influence over coordination and strategic prioritisation of international assistance,¹⁰⁸ the ability to engage with governments in countries receiving support, and also allow it to target structural drivers of conflict, including poverty, governance and inequality.¹⁰⁹ The UK was consistently ranked among the top of the 'Soft Power Index' as a result of its strong technical expertise, and ecosystem of government departments, businesses, civil society and academia.¹¹⁰

On the International stage, the UK was a key partner of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in November 2011. The deal was described as a 'breakthrough agreement between the G7 Plus and international partners to change the policy and practice of engagement'.¹¹¹ In line with the New Deal, the UK committed to addressing the need for a different approach to development in FCAS that must be country-owned and country-led, agreeing that donors would play a supportive role in working with FCAS, and would adapt the way aid was managed, including by being transparent with timely and predictable aid, taking risks and using country systems. In Afghanistan, for example, DFID built on the New Deal in Afghanistan at the request of the Government of Afghanistan.¹¹² As well as a major humanitarian donor (in 2015-16 the UK was its largest donor),¹¹³ Afghanistan viewed the UK "as a key partner in the Counter-Taliban and Counter-Daesh Coalition, and as a vital mediator in regional disputes".¹¹⁴

More broadly, the UK was instrumental in the creation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals,¹¹⁵ which recognised that development cannot be realised without peace and security. The SDGs were adopted by 193 member states of the United Nations and would set the development agenda for the next 15 years.¹¹⁶ In a speech given at the UN Sustainable Development Goals Summit 2015, David Cameron called on the leaders of developed countries to deliver on their promises of aid and work together to eradicate extreme poverty.

Supporting the UN to improve peacekeeping operations

Funding from the CSSF has been instrumental in numerous processes that enable UN frameworks to make evidence-based decisions in delivery of their mandate to de-escalate conflicts and improve security in FCAS.

For example, the UK supported the development of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) that allows peacekeeping missions to systematically assess their operating environment and use data and analysis to evaluate progress towards their goals.¹¹⁷ The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) used CPAS to support the evaluation of their operations around the elections in 2020/21. MINUSCA learned lessons from this evaluation that enabled them to implement strategic and operational adjustments for the third round of legislative elections, including reducing the exposure of polling stations to possible attack. CPAS data later revealed an 84% decrease in human rights violations and a 36% increase in the number of polling stations that remained open during the December 2020 and March 2021 elections.¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁸The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹⁰⁹The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹¹⁰Care International UK. "UK Leadership On Gender Equality". March 2022:

https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/attachments/Policy_briefing_-_UK_leadership_on_gender_equality_globally.pdf

¹¹¹Bozek, Felix Grenfell. "Justine Greening should reaffirm the UK's commitment to a New Deal for the world's poorest", Left Foot Forward, April 18 2013, <https://leftfootforward.org/2013/04/justine-greening-should-reaffirm-the-uks-commitment-to-the-new-deal/>

¹¹²Parliament Publications, "The Future of Afghanistan: Development Progress and Prospects after 2014", parliament.uk,

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/writew/afghan/m06.html>

¹¹³War Child, "A CRITICAL FRIEND? HOW THE UK USES ITS INFLUENCE TO PROTECT CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN CONFLICT", september 19, 2018,

<https://www.warchild.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-02/War-Child-UK-Report-A-Critical-Friend.pdf>

¹¹⁴Afghanistan Embassy, "The Minister of Defence Visits London", The Afghanistan Embassy, February 20, 2018,

<http://afghanistanembassy.org.uk/english/afghan-minister-of-defence-visits-london/>

¹¹⁵Global Goals. "Global Goals: Overcoming the World's Challenges."

<https://www.globalgoals.org>

¹¹⁶UN, "Historic New Sustainable Development Agenda Unanimously Adopted by 193 UN Members", United Nations, September 25, 2015,

<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-development-agenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/>

¹¹⁷Conflict, Stability and Security Fund,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/conflict-stability-and-security-fund/about>

¹¹⁸Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "Conflict Stability and Security Fund Annual Report 2020 to 2021", gov.uk, December 15, 2021,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1040994/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2020-2021.pdf

In Lebanon, which currently hosts the largest number of refugees per capita of any country in the world,¹¹⁹ The UK has supported the UN-led Lebanon Host Communities Support programme (LHSP) since 2014.¹²⁰ This works to reduce the risk of violent extremism and community-level conflict by addressing causes of tension among and between Lebanon host and Syrian refugee communities and improve the quality and delivery of basic services.¹²¹

Improving UK cross government policy coherence and coordination

Integrated and joint capabilities were a growing feature of the UK Government approach in FCAS. By combining UK political interests through diplomatic efforts that were reinforced by DFID's presence on the ground and funding for specific interventions, the UK was able to create an influential role. Through DFID, there was evidence of programmes which delivered positive results, often in very challenging environments.¹²²

There was progress at UK level, with evidence of effective cross- government working in relation to fragile states, in particular between DFID, the MOD, the FCO, the Home Office, the Stabilisation Unit, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Justice.¹²³ For example, Cross-government working between DFID, the FCO and the MOD produced the BSOS in July 2011.¹²⁴ DFID worked through the National Security Council (NSC) to strengthen UK efforts to prevent and tackle conflict, working closely on The Conflict Prevention Pool and the Conflict Stability and Security Fund.¹²⁵ The NSC worked to balance security and development priorities of work within FCAS, though it was noted that strategic coherence between cross-government NSC strategies and a bottom-up country office-led programming could be better aligned, particularly when it came to managing the inherent risk at field level.¹²⁶

As a department, DFID was recognised for having experts at the table with deep technical expertise, positioning the UK as a key player that was taken very seriously.¹²⁷ It was widely recognised that DFID's presence on the ground was key to effective programming in FCAS. Communication with stakeholders, understanding of the context and the ability to exert influence were significantly enhanced if DFID staff were co-located with project delivery.

For example, a case study from a DFID programme in Goma highlighted how the presence of a DFID programme manager, with good experience of the country context, added considerable focus and influence to the organisation's engagement with the peace and stability agenda in this complex environment. By contrast, all three programmes in Kasai Occidentale engaged in different ways but without coordination or attempts to link processes or share lessons.¹²⁸

Recent changes in strategic focus and funding decisions continue to risk increasing existing fragilities in Fragile and Conflict Affected States, with warnings of further economic damage, regional instability and rises in violence

Despite the progress made for engagement in FCAS over the last decade, there have also been some inconsistencies and set-backs seen in commitments, policy and practise.

¹¹⁹UNHCR, "UNHCR Lebanon at a glance", <https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance>

¹²⁰Foreign & Commonwealth Office, "UK supports host communities in South Lebanon", gov.uk, June 4, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-supports-host-communities-in-south-lebanon>

¹²¹UNDP, Lebanon Host Communities Support (LHSP), <https://www.undp.org/lebanon/projects/lebanon-host-communities-support-lhsp>

¹²²ICAI. "Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID's support to fragile states". 2015: <https://icaei.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

¹²³ICAI. "Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID's support to fragile states". 2015: <https://icaei.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

¹²⁴Ministry of Defence, "Building Stability Overseas Strategy", Asset Publishing Service, July 1, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

¹²⁵The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹²⁶ICAI. "Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID's support to fragile states". 2015: <https://icaei.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

¹²⁷CARE

¹²⁸ICAI. "Assessing the impact of the scale-up of DFID's support to fragile states". 2015: <https://icaei.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFIDs-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf>

Against the backdrop of the COVID pandemic, the UK made decisions to shift priorities and resources. In June 2022, Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, announced intentions to implement a DFID-FCO merger, ending 23 years of institutional separation between development and foreign policy in the UK government.¹²⁹ Despite arguments from the Government that the merger was motivated by a desire to improve efficiency, many perceived this to be unpersuasive, and a thinly veiled attempt to redirect ODA towards countries considered to be more strategically valuable. This came into fruition during the Integrated Review, where politically driven decisions to reassess priority countries saw the reduction in ODA to FCAS. This coincides with the narrowing focus of the CSSF within the IR to 'the foundational link between stability, resilience and security, and work with governments and civil society in regions that are of greatest priority to the UK', within the broader. Within the IR, the 'Conflict and instability' also fell within the section on 'Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas', highlighting the shift to a security, rather than a development lens.¹³⁰

The UK also made a significant reduction to UK ODA driven by a decline in GNI, and slashed the commitment to spend 50% of DFID's budget in FCAS. The impacts of these decisions impacted many FCAS across the world, as they were at odds with growing levels of poverty, and disproportionately fell on some of the FCAS expected to appear on the list of countries with the highest number of extreme poor by 2030. They were also not transparent or consultative, and left little to no scope for conflict sensitivity in their implementation. The cuts were at odds with other government targets, undermined previous commitments to long-term investment in conflict prevention, and undermined the trust between partners, communities and authorities, which, ultimately, will weaken groups' and institutions' ability to contribute to peace.

Shifts in priorities are at odds with growing levels of poverty

The Proportion of DFID/FCDO bilateral ODA to FCAS has fallen from 57% in 2019 to 43% in 2021

Commitments and policy pledges made towards FCAS in recent years have not been sufficiently or proportionately resourced in practice. The proportion of DFID's bilateral ODA that went to FCAS in 2015 was 53% (£3,790m). It rose to 57% in 2017. There is then a fall to 54% in 2020 and a sharper fall to 43% in 2021.¹³¹ The FCDO's data for multilateral spend is not available for comparison.

In 2021, FCDO bilateral ODA to FCAS fell by 39%, a cut of £740m.

Year	% of bilateral DFID/FCDO ODA budget to FCAS
2015	53% ¹³²
2017	57% ¹³³
2020	54%
2021	43%

Those living below the poverty line in FCAS received less bilateral FCDO ODA per person than people living below the poverty line in non-FCAS

In 2021, people living below the poverty line in FCAS received an average of 0.35 GBP per person of FCDO bilateral funding. This is compared to 1.70 GBP per person living below the poverty line in not fragile states. This analysis compared the FCDO's bilateral ODA disbursements in 2021 with the World Bank's 2021 FCAS list. It measured this against poverty rates by country in 2022 from the World Population Review.^{134 135}

¹²⁹Devanny, Joe. "The Conservative Party and DFID: party starcraft and development policy since 1997", Contemporary British History Volume 36, Issue 1 (2022), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13619462.2021.1969232>

¹³⁰The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹³¹This analysis was done using figures from FCDO + Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)

¹³²GOV UK, "DFIR Spend on Fragile States and Regions". 2015-2017:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/624890/Results-by-Sector-Fragile-states-and-regions.pdf

¹³³bid

¹³⁴World population Review. "Poverty Rate by Country 2022." Updated 2022:

<https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poverty-rate-by-country>

¹³⁵This Data is compiled from the official Poverty rates from the World Bank. According to the World Bank, they are from official government sources or are

computed by World Bank staff using national (i.e. country-specific) poverty lines

	Total bilateral ODA		FCDO bilateral ODA	
	Average received /per person in GBP	Average received / per person living below the poverty line in GBP	Average received / per person in GBP	Average received / per person living below the poverty line in GBP
FCAS	0.196	0.555	0.144	0.356
Stable	0.713	3.387	0.368	1.709

Across the board of total UK bilateral ODA in 2021, figures show that the more conflict affected a state is, the less ODA on average was received per person living below the poverty line, despite the increasing vulnerabilities in FCAS.

For example, people living below the poverty line in 'medium intensity conflict' countries received on average 0.304 GBP of bilateral ODA, whereas people living below the poverty line in countries classified as 'high institutional and social fragility' received 0.68 GBP of bilateral ODA. In non-FCAS, people living below the poverty line received 3.387 GBP of bilateral ODA per person.

For High Fragility Conflict countries like Syria and Libya, there is no accurate data on population size, nor poverty levels. There were just four countries classified as 'high intensity conflict' in 2021, and Syria and Libya were two of them. Therefore, to create an average would be misleading.¹³⁶

Classification	Total	Average received / per person in GBP	Average received / per person below the poverty line in GBP
High Intensity Conflict	391,767,732.400		
Medium Intensity Conflict	607,085,094.250	0.151	0.304
High Fragile	280,258,970.230	0.182	0.680
Stable Contexts	1,470,294,604.940	0.713	3.387

The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) was published in March 2021, just ahead of FY 21. The IR prioritised an integrated approach to conflict and instability. It also committed to place "greater emphasis on addressing the drivers of conflict (such as grievances, political marginalisation and criminal economies), atrocity prevention and strengthening fragile countries' resilience to external interference".

¹³⁶Data analysis from the wonderful Ghassan Aziz

The integrated review laid out plans to regroup countries into three new groupings; Africa, Indo-Pacific, and Rest of the World,¹³⁷ decisions which seem at odds with efforts to strengthen FCAS. Regions which had historically been prioritised by the UK because they were FCAS, such as the Middle East and Africa (beyond parts of East Africa and strategic players like Nigeria) were downgraded beyond trade policy.

In a letter to The Chair of the International Development Committee, Sarah Champion, in 2021,¹³⁸ Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab outlined the new priority countries, **showing a complete withdrawal of bilateral support from many FCAS countries including: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Iraq, Mali, Niger, RoC, Eritrea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Laos PDR, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, West Bank and Gaza.** There was also no reference to the 2016 categories of 'high fragility', 'moderate fragility', 'low fragility' and 'neighbouring 'high fragility' states.¹³⁹

The UK's 2021 Priority Countries

Africa	Burundi
	DRC
	Ethiopia
	Ghana
	Kenya
	Liberia
	Malawi
	Mozambique
	Nigeria
	Rwanda
	Sierra Leone
	Somalia
	South Sudan
	Southern Africa
	Sudan
	Tanzania
	Uganda
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	
Indo-Pacific	Afghanistan
	Bangladesh
	China
	India
	Indonesia
	Myanmar
	Nepal
	Pakistan

¹³⁷Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy", Gov.uk, July 2, 2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy>

¹³⁸Raab, Dominic. "Thematic and Geographic Areas", Parliament Committees, June 3, 2021, <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/6155/documents/68757/default/>

¹³⁹DFID. "UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest." UK GOV. November 2015:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf

The UK's 2021 Priority Countries (Continued)

Rest of World	Brazil
	Columbia
	Mexico
	Syria
	Turkey
	Venezuela
	Yemen

Only 41% of the UK's 'priority countries' in 2020 have a place on the World Bank's Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations list

The UK's 2021 list of 'priority countries' list contains just 14 conflict affected states from the World Bank's FY21 List of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations¹⁴⁰ and four countries classified as experiencing 'Institutional and Social Fragility'. Twenty countries on the UK's 2020 priority list are not classified by the World Bank as FCAS.

There are no public references made by the UK to indicate if broader indices of fragile states that were drawn upon in the development of this list. The next integrated review must reset the priority list, drawing on frameworks that consider Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations, such as those produced by the UN and the World Bank. To strengthen transparency around funding decisions, the UK must also publish the specific criteria and components from each of these existing indices that have been used in the creation of this new priority list.

ODA cuts to FCAS affect the poorest and most marginalised people in fragile and conflict-affected states

UK ODA was £11,423 million in 2021, a decrease of £3,054 million (21.1 per cent) on 2020. Figures for ODA spending for 2021 show that humanitarian assistance decreased by £788m, 51.5% between 2020 and 2021. By definition, this is going to affect the poorest and most marginalised people in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Using the World Bank's list of FCAS from FY21 as a framework, three of the four FCAS from the World Bank's list of 'High Intensity Conflicts' appeared in the top 20 recipient countries of UK ODA, however the distribution of ODA was not proportionate in relation to level of fragility. Afghanistan was the highest recipient of UK ODA, with 187M, however, Somalia is 7th on the list, with 101M, and Syria was 10th on the list with 91M. Libya despite appearing in the 'High Intensity Conflict' bracket of the World Bank's list of Fragile and Conflict Affected States, did not fall into the top 20 of recipient countries of UK ODA.

From the 'Medium-Intensity Conflict' bracket, four countries appeared on the list of the top 20 recipients of UK ODA, Nigeria, Yemen, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The distribution of ODA was not proportionate, as they occurred 2nd, 5th, 8th and 13th on the list, and received 140M, 114M, 96M and 73M, respectively.

South Africa was the recipient of the 6th largest amount of ODA in 2021, despite not being on the World Bank's FCAS list. South Africa's rank increased 22 ranks, with ODA contributions of £102m, an increase of £54.2m compared to 2020. This increase is in part due to a new BEIS climate finance programme.¹⁴¹ Investment in climate finance is, of course, welcomed, but these charts show the impacts of using the ODA budget for climate finance.

¹⁴⁰The World Bank, "FY23 List of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations", The World Bank, July 1, 2022, <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/69b1d088e3c48ebe2cdf451e30284f04-0090082022/original/FCSList-FY23.pdf>

¹⁴¹Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "Statistics on International Development: final UK aid spend 2021", Gov.uk, November 23, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1119765/Statistics-on-International-Development-Final-UK-Aid-Spend-2021.pdf


Alarming, despite this high vulnerability, the more fragile a country is, the less climate finance it has historically received from bilateral funders and multilateral climate funds. For example, extremely fragile states averaged £1.75 per person in adaptation financing compared to £135 per person for not-fragile states.¹⁴² The UK must deliver on its previous commitments to the £11.6B climate finance pledge, but this cannot come at the expense of marginalised communities in FCAS, and must be sustainable and conflict-sensitive.

FY21 List of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations

HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT	MEDIUM-INTENSITY CONFLICT	HIGH INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL FRAGILITY
Afghanistan Libya Somalia Syrian Arab Republic	Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Dem. Rep. Iraq Mali Mozambique Myanmar Niger Nigeria South Sudan Yemen, Rep.	NON-SMALL STATES
		Burundi Congo, Rep. Eritera Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Haiti Kosovo Lao PDR Lebanon Liberia Papua New Guinea Sudan Venezuela, RB West Bank and Gaza (territory) Zimbabe
		SMALL STATES
		Comoros Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Solomon Islands Timor-Leste Tuvalu

¹⁴²Mercy Corps, "Breaking the cycle: Practical solutions to unlock climate finance for fragile states", Mercy Corps, November, 2022, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/MC-Breaking-the-cycle_web_Final.pdf

Top 20 Recipients of UK ODA in 2021



Source of data from graph here¹⁴³

Classification on the World Bank List for 2021	
High Intensity Conflict	
Medium Intensity Conflict	
High Institutional and Social Fragility	
No Classification	

The cuts negatively impacted partnerships with local peacebuilders and humanitarian actors

The UK, through DFID took time to create a robust operating model for working in FCAS. Issues like human resources, skills mix and partnering strategy were negatively impacted when the UK's priorities shifted and ODA was cut. The cuts, and the way they were implemented, were said by NGOs to have strongly damaged long-term collaborative partnerships.¹⁴⁴ In evidence given to the International Development Committee in March 2022, various CSOs and NGOs outlined the damage that had been done to the UK's relationships in-country due to lack of transparency during the decisions to cut ODA.¹⁴⁵

Within the Integrated Review, the term 'peace' is used generically and neither peacemaking or peacebuilding are mentioned explicitly. The boundaries of the UK's programmes that relate to peacebuilding are not clarified, so providing an accurate and measurable representation is not possible.

However, figures show that the UK cut bilateral ODA to conflict, peace and security by £278m in 2021, a cut of 15% from 2020. The UK also reduced the budget to the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), which spent £426 million of ODA in 2021, a decrease of £108 million (20.2 per cent), from 2020. This signifies a broader withdrawal from the type of funding modalities needed to enable local actors to take a prominent role in long-term peace efforts.

¹⁴³Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "Statistics on International Development: final UK aid spend 2021", Gov.uk, November 23, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1119765/Statistics-on-International-Development-Final-UK-Aid-Spend-2021.pdf

¹⁴⁴Hargrave, Russell. "Aid cuts have led to unexpected sackings and damaged partnerships, charities tell MPs", Civil Society, June 23, 2021, <https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/aid-cuts-unexpected-sackings-damaged-partnerships.html>

¹⁴⁵UK Parliament Committees, "MPs hear from experts on real-world impact of aid cuts", UK Parliament, March 17, 2022, <https://committees.parliament.uk/work/940/future-of-uk-aid/news/164914/mps-hear-from-experts-on-realworld-impact-of-aid-cuts/>

Reductions in support of programmes in FCAS¹⁴⁶ and the 2022 IDC report on racism noted that “the manner in which the cuts to UK aid took place, with little or no consultation of downstream partners, or the communities where they are implemented has sent a harmful message that the UK does not care about the people affected” and “the structure of the sector transfers much of the risk to frontline implementing partners who have the least capacity to mitigate those risks”.^{147 148} This, coupled with the shift towards funding through projects rather than core funding, which limits the ability for organisations like NGOs to maintain capacity and expertise, has impacted the trust and nuanced understanding of complex conflict factors required for effective delivery of ODA in FCAS.¹⁴⁹

These actions are at direct odds with the way of thinking and working required when striving to work ‘authentically in local partnership’. Local partnerships require ‘long-term relationships,¹⁵⁰ yet the cuts to ODA damaged trust. Local partnerships require ‘difficult conversations with people actively involved in violence,¹⁵¹ yet the cuts to ODA were not transparent or consultative. Local partnership requires us to ‘decolonise’ our relationships and a root and branch transformation of power – from strategy and programme design, to who is in the room, who is listened to and who gets the funding, and to helping to protect civic space and human rights.¹⁵² The cuts to ODA took the partners out of the room.

“Perhaps one of the great outcomes of the Syrian Revolution was the emergence of independent civil society organisations that filled the gap of governmental services inside the country.

UK DFID was one of the bilateral donors that facilitated the formation of these new Syrian civil society organisations, complementing their humanitarian and peacebuilding activities, and supporting their capacities.

The FCDO needs to uphold these commitments, or the progress that was made with civil society in Syria will face rollbacks which will have a disastrous effect on the humanitarian situation in Syria.”

Mazen Alhousseiny, Syrian Activist

The cuts rolled back previous gains on reducing inequality

Beyond the direct implications of reduced ODA to FCAS, cuts have also risked undermining UK leadership in other fields, such as work to reduce inequalities. For example, The ‘UK NAP promised to integrate an inclusive and gender-sensitive framework for conflict prevention and resolution,¹⁵³ yet we know that despite previous commitments to women and girls, the cuts had a negative impact on ODA for women and girls and on the UK’s ability to influence globally.¹⁵⁴ ODA to gender in Iraq, for example, fell by 45% in 2020, Total ODA to gender in Yemen fell by 19% from 2019 to 2020.

¹⁴⁶Worley, William. “Tracking the UK’s controversial aid cuts”, devex, November 25, 2022
<https://www.devex.com/news/tracking-the-uk-s-controversial-aid-cuts-99883>

¹⁴⁷Kirk, Ashley, Kommenda, Niko. “Devastating: how UK’s foreign aid cuts could hurt the world’s poorest”, The Guardian, August 23 2021,
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ng-interactive/2021/aug/23/devastating-how-cuts-in-uks-foreign-aid-could-hurt-the-worlds-poorest>

¹⁴⁸Davies, Lizzy. “Where UK aid cuts bite deepest – stories from the sharp end”, The Guardian, July 18, 2021,
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jul/18/where-uk-aid-cuts-bite-deepest-stories-from-the-sharp-end>

¹⁴⁹The Foreign Policy Centre, “A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries”, The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021,
<https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹⁵⁰The Foreign Policy Centre, “A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries”, The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021,
<https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹⁵¹Ibid

¹⁵²The Foreign Policy Centre, “A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries”, The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021,
<https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>



¹⁵³Care, UK LEADERSHIP ON GENDER EQUALITY GLOBALLY Learning from past lessons on where the UK should invest for women and girls”, Care International, March, 2022,

https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/attachments/Policy_briefing_-_UK_leadership_on_gender_equality_globally.pdf

¹⁵⁴Ibid

Snapshot

- Total UK ODA to Iraq fell by 43% from 2019 to 2020
- Total UK ODA to gender to Iraq increased over the years, specifically 94% from 2009 to 2019.



The cuts impacted the UK's influence internationally

In 2021, the UK hosted several international conferences, including the G7 and COP26. It was broadly recognised that cutting ODA would damage the UK's leadership status at these summits.

Anthony Mangnall MP, who was previously an adviser to William Hague at the Foreign Office, warned of the impact on the UK's ability to influence, saying "The UK is the only G7 country cutting aid, and yet we are hosting the G7 summit in the UK in June".¹⁵⁵

This was echoed by Baroness Liz Sugg, who said "Britain, as a force for good, sets global standards and defends the rules-based international system. Legal opinion like this risks undermining our credibility on the world stage at the very moment we need to strike trade deals, negotiate communiques and agree ambitious legally binding climate targets. Cutting our aid and overseas investments sends a message that Britain is withdrawing from the world at the very moment we should be showing strong leadership."

Recent decisions signal a shift away from tackling the the long-term drivers of conflict

The aid cuts also impact the UK's broader commitments to promoting stability and resilience. For example, The FCDO is developing a Conflict Strategic Framework (CSF) which has the potential to mitigate some of the damaging impacts of the cuts. There is an opportunity to strengthen the way the UK works in FCAS by investing in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and mediation. However, whilst a cross-government conflict strategy is welcomed, if there are more cuts to many of the interventions that ODA has previously supported that we know work to prevent conflict and strengthen peacebuilding, the CSF won't have the impact it could. It also undermines the interventions in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding space that come from other budgets.

Despite the UK's history of recognising the value of investing in a conflict prevention approach, the aid cuts marked a broader trend of diverting resources towards rapid response at the expense of addressing the long-term causes of conflict.¹⁵⁶ Development projects that contribute to peacebuilding activities require significant operational capacities among partners (international and national) within recipient countries – which, once unfunded, are difficult to re-establish quickly. They require networks with local stakeholders which have been broken by the lack of transparency during the aid cuts.¹⁵⁷ While rapid response is crucial and can prevent violence from breaking out or escalating, it is crucial to ensure that the UK reverts back to and scales up investment in longer-term interventions, partnerships and relationships to address the causes of conflict before violence breaks out.

Latest figures on ODA spends show that the largest year on year changes amongst non-FCDO contributors were the Home Office.¹⁵⁸ With a total of £1,041 million in 2021, an increase of £444 million, or 74.3 per cent, on 2020,¹⁵⁹ This was the largest sector to receive UK bilateral ODA spend in 2021 and is the first time this sector has been in the UK's top five sectors, as a result of spending increasing in this sector while it decreased in all others. This came at the expense of all other programs, and marginalised communities in FCAS have lost out on humanitarian support, health programmes and education so that the UK can subsidise its domestic costs.¹⁶⁰

Supporting refugees in the UK is vital, but domestic costs must not come at the expense of marginalised communities around the world. It is expected that the Home Office will require an estimated to be between £3 billion and 5 billion for 2022 alone,¹⁶¹ and whilst the Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly, announced £2.5 billion (£1b this year and £1.5b next year) to cover the Home Office's in-donor refugee costs, this commitment is not enough. This preference for short-term stability over longer-term solutions needed for peacebuilding is counter-productive because investing in conflict prevention, conflict reduction and peacebuilding reduces uncertainty in the international peace and security landscape and reduces threats to the UK from this kind of instability.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁵Wintour, Patrick. "Cutting aid will damage UK leadership of G7 and COP26 summit, PM told". The Guardian. April 2021: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/05/cutting-aid-will-damage-uk-leadership-of-g7-and-cop26-summit-pm-told>

¹⁵⁶ibid

¹⁵⁷The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

¹⁵⁸https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1119765/Statistics-on-International-Development-Final-UK-Aid-Spend-2021.pdf

¹⁵⁹https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1119765/Statistics-on-International-Development-Final-UK-Aid-Spend-2021.pdf

¹⁶⁰<https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2022/11/whats-been-happening-to-uk-aid-this-week-cuts-cuts-and-more-cuts/>

¹⁶¹Worley, William, "Autumn Budget". Devex. November 2022:

<https://www.devex.com/news/autumn-budget-uk-to-spend-an-extra-2-5b-to-help-refugee-costs-104478>

¹⁶²The Foreign Policy Centre, "A Force for Good?: Examining UK Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries", The Foreign Policy Centre, December 6, 2021, <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Force-for-Good-publication-06-Dec-2021.pdf>

The nature of conflict in the world is changing, along with the challenges they present for the UK

The U.K. has committed a total of £1.5 billion (\$1.7 billion) in humanitarian and economic support for Ukraine,¹⁶³ which is currently half of the total humanitarian budget. Refugee costs for Ukraine have also become an urgent issue. The commitments to Ukraine are welcomed, but they are far stronger than other crises of similar scale. Analysis from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) found that humanitarian assistance in Ukraine was far more substantial than in Syria, Yemen, or Afghanistan.¹⁶⁴ In terms of financial and humanitarian assistance, the UK's commitments to Ukraine will require a significant portion of the humanitarian assistance budget.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, based on commitments between February 24 and October 17, Devex's Funding Platform has recorded more than \$100 billion in commitments for Ukraine.¹⁶⁶

As well as the diversion of ODA, the crisis in Ukraine will have wider implications for FCAS. It has impacted financial networks globally,¹⁶⁷ international relations, and global food and commodity prices, with dangerous implications for the world's poorest.¹⁶⁸ The conflict is also having specific and significant impacts on other FCAS. Rising food prices are exacerbating humanitarian suffering in an already precarious economy after a decade of conflict.

As the global attention is focused on Ukraine, protracted crises, like Syria for example, are slipping further down policymakers' list of priorities—just as conditions for the people of Syria are about to become even more dire. Secondly, the conflict has seen the suspension of bilateral dialogue within the UN Security Council (UNSC), which has previously produced some meaningful humanitarian compromises.¹⁶⁹ The suspension of this dialogue as the war in Ukraine continues, including negotiations on the renewal of the UN mandated cross border resolution into Syria, has dire implications for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Syria and other negotiations that support humanitarian aid, and may also have wider-ranging security and political consequences.

¹⁶³Johnson, Boris. "PM announces further £1 billion in military support to Ukraine", Gov.uk, June 30, 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-announces-further-1-billion-in-military-support-to-ukraine>

¹⁶⁴Ainsworth, David, "Funding tracker: who's sending aid to Ukraine". Devex. 2022: <https://www.devex.com/news/funding-tracker-who-s-sending-aid-to-ukraine-102887>

¹⁶⁵The IDS, published in May 2022, signals a further shift away from effective UK engagement in FCAS. When directly referencing fragile states, the strategy states that the UK will "make more targeted investments of our resources and our efforts in fragile states or where there are compelling trade and investment opportunities". This signals clear intentions to now put geopolitics, investment and trade above poverty alleviation. The strategy references the SDGs just once and 'its focus on economics and short-term political gains over tackling the root causes of global crises such as inequality, conflict and climate change. The strategy also lays out plans to focus trade and investments in middle-income countries, rather than in countries where people are living in poverty whose national and economic infrastructures have been damaged by conflict.

¹⁶⁶Ainsworth, David. "Funding tracker: Who's sending aid to Ukraine?", October 18, 2022 <https://www.devex.com/news/funding-tracker-who-s-sending-aid-to-ukraine-102887>

¹⁶⁷Wheatley, Jonathan, Smith, Colby. "Russia sanctions threaten to erode dominance of US dollar, says IMF." Financial Times. March 2022: <https://www.ft.com/content/3e0760d4-8127-41db-9546-e62b6f8f5773>

¹⁶⁸Beasley, David. "The Ukraine war could leave hundreds of millions hungry around the world" The Washington Post, March 8, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/07/ukraine-war-hunger-united-nations-world-food-programme/>

¹⁶⁹Heller, Sam. "Russia's War in Ukraine Will Also Hurt Syria", The Century Foundation, April 5, 2022, <https://tcf.org/content/report/russias-war-in-ukraine-will-also-hurt-syria/?agreed=1>

Conclusion: the UK government should return to a focus on FCAS – but to be effective strategies need to be defined and delivered with a clear emphasis on poverty reduction

In policy productivity terms, the UK has historically been at the forefront of engagement in FCAS. It used substantial political and financial commitments to support people in FCAS, and influenced other governments and donors to follow suit. The commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA, and the focus of 50% of DfID's budget in fragile states and regions were in place to help alleviate global poverty, maintaining the integrity of UK aid as per its current definition. The UK also played an important supportive role in reducing conflict and addressing the root causes of conflict, another critical component of its definition.

At present, UK engagement in FCAS is unduly limited by the cuts to UK ODA and the reset of international development priorities, including priority countries. These decisions restricted the capacity of ODA to reach those furthest behind. The impact of the decisions has also weakened relationships with local partners, favoured short-term stability over the longer-term commitments required for peacebuilding, and rolled back efforts to promote conflict sensitivity.

Whilst it is important to recognise that the UK can only do so much in silo, the UK government now has the opportunity to expand upon and refine its work in FCAS, taking credit for existing strengths and recognising persistent limitations. A reaffirmed and strengthened focus of UK ODA on reducing poverty and addressing its root causes would be the first step in rectifying these limitations.

This paper is launched in the context of predictions of another round of aid cuts. UK aid is set to remain "around" 0.5%, despite more and more of it going towards the Home Office's UK refugee hosting costs. The forthcoming Integrated Review and Spending Review offer opportunities to resume and build on its previous commitments to work in FCAS.

To do this, the UK will need to reaffirm and build on financial commitments to FCAS, starting with the pledge to spend 50% of the FCDO's budget in FCAS. It must also ensure UK ODA includes multi-year, flexible and scaled up funding for responding to rapidly evolving context and conflict dynamics. It must invest in expertise and partnerships with local peacebuilders, including women and girls and marginalised communities. Its approach should also be both conflict and gender sensitive, and should be cohesive across the whole of government to ensure a joined-up approach to international peace and security. While commending the international response to the crisis in Ukraine, the UK must ensure that resources are not diverted from unmet humanitarian needs of people in other crises. It is worth looking ahead as the solidarity shown to the people of Ukraine can help reshape and refocus efforts towards increased responsibility- sharing.

Poverty in more stable places is on the decline, but in FCAS, the numbers of people in absolute poverty will increase. The UK recognised then – and must now – that unless ODA is used to focus on tackling conflict in FCAS, and supporting people affected by conflict – poverty trends are likely to worsen further.

Annexes

FCDO bilateral ODA £	conflict and fragile classification	Country	Total Population As of 30th November 2022	% below the poverty line	% below the poverty line/100	Total Population below the poverty line	total/individuals £	total/people below the poverty line £	total/individuals by FCDO £	total/ people below the poverty line FCDO £
186,270,774.45	High intensity conflict	Afghanistan	411,287,710	54.50	0.55	224,151,801.85	0.455188342	0.835207968	0.404268765	0.74177755
0.00	Medium intensity conflict	Burkina Faso	226,737,620	41.40	0.41	93,869,374.68	0.000885362	0.002138556	0	0
802,036.43	High fragile non-small	Burundi	128,895,760	64.90	0.65	83,653,348.24	0.006222385	0.009587619	0.006222385	0.009587619
6,968,854.76	Medium intensity conflict	Cameroon	279,145,360	37.50	0.38	104,679,510.00	0.028767116	0.076712308	0.024964967	0.066573246
9,923,210.72	Medium intensity conflict	Central African Republic	55,791,440	62.00	0.62	34,590,692.80	0.177862603	0.296875165	0.177862603	0.286875165
693,661.94	Medium intensity conflict	Chad	177,233,150	42.30	0.42	74,969,622.45	0.006773872	0.016013881	0.003913639	0.009252574
0.00	High fragile small	Comoros	8,367,740	42.40	0.42	3,547,921.76	0.017800147	0.041981478	0	0
7,734.10	High fragile non-small	Congo	59,704,240	40.90	0.41	24,419,034.16	0.001186592	0.002901204	0.00012954	0.000316724
72,528,649.73	Medium intensity conflict	Congo, Dem. Rep.	990,102,120	63.90	0.64	632,675,254.68	0.073689098	0.115319402	0.073253706	0.114638038
1,637,135.90	High fragile non-small	Eritrea	36,840,320	69.00	0.69	25,419,820.80	0.044438699	0.064403912	0.044438699	0.064403912
1,626,758.86	High fragile non-small	Gambia	27,059,920	19.50	0.20	5,276,684.40	0.664850246	3.409488441	0.060116913	0.308291863
0.00	High fragile non-small	Guinea-Bissau	21,055,660	69.30	0.69	14,591,572.38	0.014728639	0.021253448	0	0
932,912.14	High fragile non-small	Haiti	115,849,960	58.50	0.59	67,772,228.60	0.008482993	0.014500842	0.008062762	0.013765405
33,626,337.36	Medium intensity conflict	Iraq	444,961,220	18.90	0.19	84,097,670.58	0.113927337	0.602790144	0.075575884	0.3998724
0.00	High fragile small	Kiribati	1,312,320	21.80	0.22	286,085.76	0.005582411	0.025607391	0	0
2,413,266.29	High fragile non-small	Kosovo								
854,323.03	High fragile non-small	Laos	75,294,750	18.30	0.18	13,778,939.25	0.014528768	0.079392173	0.011346382	0.06200209
38,238,623.87	High fragile non-small	Lebanon	54,897,390	27.40	0.27	15,041,884.86	1.055476504	3.852104328	0.660079175	2.409048082

2,647,015.60	High fragile non-small	Libera	53,026,810	50.90	0.51	26,990,646.29	0.055291443	0.10662759	0.049918439	0.09807159
5,493,278.70	High intensity conflict	Libya	68,123,410		0.00	0.00	0.187729687		0.095316407	
2,224,584.98	Medium intensity conflict	Mali	225,935,900	42.10	0.42	95,119,013.90	0.037515946	0.089111511	0.006646069	0.023387385
36,419,236.34	Medium intensity conflict	Mozambique	329,695,180	46.10	0.46	151,989,477.98	0.113721618	0.246684637	0.110463357	0.239616826
81,013,119.41	Medium intensity conflict	Myanmar	541,793,060	24.80	0.25	134,364,678.88	0.122350106	0.493347202	0.112613328	0.454005999
479,007.90	Medium intensity conflict	Niger	262,079,770	40.80	0.41	106,928,546.16	0.004139002	0.010144613	0.001827718	0.004479701
125,469.501.56	Medium intensity conflict	Nigeria	2,185,412,120	40.10	0.40	876,350,260.12	0.064127867	0.159918968	0.057412321	0.14317287
796,989.75	High fragile non-small	Papua New Guinea	101,426,190	39.90	0.40	40,469,049.81	0.011796072	0.029554091	0.00785783	0.019693809
572,388.71	High fragile small	Solomon Islands	7,242,730	12.70	0.13	919,826.71	0.082758876	0.651644693	0.079029415	0.622278856
89,172,402.00	High intensity conflict	Somalia	175,975,110		0.00	0.00	0.572219032		0.506733037	
93,883,793.03	Medium intensity conflict	South Sudan	109,131,640	76.40	0.76	83,376,572.96	0.86127098	1.153496048	0.860280236	1.126021251
92,273,768.92	High fragile non-small	Sudan	468,742,040	46.50	0.47	217,965,048.60	0.200991189	0.432239116	0.19685405	0.423342043
74,681,642.81	High intensity conflict	Syria	221,252,490	35.20	0.35	77,880,876.48	0.411608187	1.16934144	0.33754035	0.958921448
18,196.24	High fragile small	Timor-Leste	13,412,960	41.80	0.42	5,606,617.28	0.011847701	0.028343782	0.001356616	0.003245494
18,372.71	High fragile small	Tuvalu	113,120	26.30	0.26	29,750.56	0.162417875	0.617558459	0.162417875	0.617558459
2,387,412.67	High fragile non-small	Venezuela	283,016,960	33.10	0.33	93,678,613.76	0.008921805	0.029954095	0.008435582	0.025485141
21,804,787.77	High fragile non-small	West Bank & Gaza Strip (Palestine)	52,500,720	29.20	0.29	15,330,210.24	0.786840851	2.694660446	0.415323595	1.422341078
110,161,111.44	Medium intensity conflict	Yemen	336,966,140	48.60	0.49	163,765,544.04	0.339542059	0.698646213	0.326920418	0.672675758
47,543,644.14	High fragile non-small	Zimbabwe	163,205,370	38.30	0.38	62,507,656.71	0.312295371	0.815382613	0.291311763	0.760605126
1,102,584.614.25							0.196049327	0.555351599	0.143935667	0.355923162
							Average		Average by FCDO	

Total €	World Bank classification	Country	Total Population As of 30th November	Percentage below the poverty line	Percentage below the poverty line/100	Total Population of people below the poverty line	total/individuals €	total/below the poverty line €
187,213,370.69	High-intensity conflict	Afghanistan	411,287,710	54.50	0.55	224,151,801.95	0.455180342	0.835207966
12,788,718.33	High-intensity conflict	Libya	68,123,410		0.00	0.00	0.187720667	#DIV/0!
100,696,307.15	High-intensity conflict	Somalia	175,975,110		0.00	0.00	0.572219032	#DIV/0!
91,069,336.23	High-intensity conflict	Syria	221,252,490	35.20	0.35	77,880,876.48	0.411608187	1.18924144
391,767,732.40							0.406686062	1.002274703
							Average	

Total €	World Bank classification	Country	Total Population As of 30th November	Percentage in Poverty	Percentage in Poverty/100	Total Population Numbers in Poverty	total/individuals €	total/poor €
200,744.94	Medium-intensity conflict	Burkina Faso	226,737,620	41.40	0.41	93,869,374.68	0.000895362	0.002138559
8,030,206.86	Medium-intensity conflict	Cameroon	279,145,360	37.50	0.38	104,679,510.00	0.028767116	0.979712308
9,923,210.72	Medium-intensity conflict	Central African Republic	55,791,440	62.00	0.62	34,590,692.80	0.177982603	0.286675165
1,200,554.59	Medium-intensity conflict	Chad	177,233,150	42.30	0.42	74,969,622.45	0.006773872	0.016013881
72,959,732.13	Medium-intensity conflict	Congo, Dem. Rep.	990,102,120	63.90	0.64	632,675,254.68	0.073889098	0.115319402
50,693,246.99	Medium-intensity conflict	Iraq	444,961,220	18.90	0.19	84,097,670.58	0.113827337	0.602790144
8,476,199.03	Medium-intensity conflict	Mali	225,935,900	42.10	0.42	95,119,013.90	0.037515946	0.089111511
37,493,469.20	Medium-intensity conflict	Mozambique	329,695,180	46.10	0.46	151,989,477.98	0.113721818	0.246684637
66,288,438.41	Medium-intensity conflict	Myanmar	541,793,060	24.80	0.25	134,364,678.88	0.122350106	0.493347202
1,084,748.74	Medium-intensity conflict	Niger	262,079,770	40.80	0.41	106,928,546.16	0.004139002	0.010144813
140,145,818.10	Medium-intensity conflict	Nigeria	2,185,412,120	40.10	0.40	876,350,260.12	0.064127867	0.159919868
96,174,547.39	Medium-intensity conflict	South Sudan	109,131,640	76.40	0.76	83,376,572.96	0.88127098	1.153490048
114,414,177.16	Medium-intensity conflict	Yemen	336,966,140	48.60	0.49	163,765,544.04	0.339542059	0.698645213
607,885,094.25							0.151120997	0.303938427
							Average	

Total £	World Bank classification	Country	Total Population As of 30th November	Percentage in Poverty	Percentage in Poverty/100	Total Population Numbers in Poverty	total/individuals £	total/poor £
802,036.43	High fragile non-small	Burundi	128,895,760	64.90	0.65	83,653,348.24	0.006222365	0.009587619
148,947.00	High fragile small	Comoros	8,367,740	42.40	0.42	3,547,921.76	0.017800147	0.041981478
70,844.60	High non-small	Congo	59,704,240	40.90	0.41	24,419,034.16	0.001186592	0.002981204
1,637,135.90	High fragile non-small	Eritrea	36,840,320	69.00	0.69	25,419,820.80	0.044438699	0.064403912
17,990,794.47	High fragile non-small	Gambia	27,059,920	19.50	0.20	5,276,684.40	0.664850246	3.409488441
310,121.22	High fragile non-small	Guinea-Bissau	21,055,660	69.30	0.69	14,591,572.38	0.014728630	0.021253448
982,754.35	High fragile non-small	Haiti	115,849,960	58.50	0.59	67,772,226.60	0.008482993	0.014500842
7,325.91	High fragile small	Kiribati	1,312,320	21.80	0.22	286,085.76	0.005582411	0.025007391
5,351,084.99	High fragile non-small	Kosovo						
1,093,939.93	High fragile non-small	Laos	75,294,750	18.30	0.18	13,778,939.25	0.014528798	0.079392173
57,942,905.26	High fragile non-small	Lebanon	54,897,390	27.40	0.27	15,041,884.86	1.055476504	3.852104028
2,931,928.85	High fragile non-small	Liberia	53,026,810	50.90	0.51	26,990,646.29	0.055291443	0.10862759
1,196,430.65	High fragile non-small	Papua New Guinea	101,426,190	39.90	0.40	40,469,049.81	0.011796072	0.029564091
599,400.19	High fragile small	Solomon Islands	7,242,730	12.70	0.13	919,826.71	0.082758875	0.651644693
94,213,020.02	High fragile non-small	Sudan	468,742,040	46.50	0.47	217,965,048.60	0.200991189	0.432239116
158,912.74	High fragile small	Timor-Leste	13,412,960	41.80	0.42	5,606,617.28	0.011847701	0.028343782
18,372.71	High fragile small	Tuvalu	113,120	26.30	0.26	29,750.56	0.162417875	0.617558459
2,525,022.25	High fragile non-small	Venezuela	283,016,960	33.10	0.33	93,678,613.76	0.008921805	0.028954095
41,309,711.20	High fragile non-small	West Bank & Gaza Strip (Palestine)	52,500,720	29.20	0.29	15,330,210.24	0.706640651	2.684660448
50,968,281.56	High fragile non-small	Zimbabwe	163,205,370	38.30	0.38	62,507,656.71	0.312295371	0.815292913
280,258,970.23							0.182445187	0.680326601
							Average	

Total €	conflict and fragile classification	Country	Total Population As of 30th November	Percentage in Poverty	Percentage in Poverty/100	Total Population Numbers in Poverty	total/individuals €	total/poor €
602,036.43	High institutional and social fragility	Burundi	128,895,760	64.90	0.65	83,653,348.24	0.006222365	0.009587619
148,947.00	High institutional and social fragility	Comoros	8,367,740	42.40	0.42	3,547,921.76	0.017800147	0.041981476
70,844.60	High institutional and social fragility	Congo	59,704,240	40.90	0.41	24,419,034.16	0.001186592	0.002901204
1,637,135.90	High institutional and social fragility	Eritrea	36,840,320	69.00	0.69	25,419,820.80	0.044436699	0.064403912
17,990,794.47	High institutional and social fragility	Gambia	27,059,920	19.50	0.20	5,276,684.40	0.664850246	3.409488441
310,121.22	High institutional and social fragility	Guinea-Bissau	21,055,660	69.30	0.69	14,591,572.38	0.014726639	0.021253445
982,754.35	High institutional and social fragility	Haiti	115,849,960	58.50	0.59	67,772,226.60	0.008482993	0.014500642
7,325.91	High institutional and social fragility	Kiribati	1,312,320	21.80	0.22	286,085.76	0.005582411	0.025607391
5,351,084.99	High institutional and social fragility	Kosovo						
1,093,939.93	High institutional and social fragility	Laos	75,294,750	18.30	0.18	13,778,939.25	0.014528768	0.079382173
57,942,905.26	High institutional and social fragility	Lebanon	54,897,390	27.40	0.27	15,041,884.86	1.055476504	3.852104028
2,931,928.85	High institutional and social fragility	Liberia	53,026,810	50.90	0.51	26,990,646.29	0.055291443	0.10862759
1,196,430.65	High institutional and social fragility	Papua New Guinea	101,426,190	39.90	0.40	40,469,049.81	0.011796072	0.029564091
599,400.19	High institutional and social fragility	Solomon Islands	7,242,730	12.70	0.13	919,826.71	0.082758876	0.651844693
94,213,020.02	High institutional and social fragility	Sudan	468,742,040	46.50	0.47	217,965,048.60	0.200991189	0.432239116
158,912.74	High institutional and social fragility	Timor-Leste	13,412,960	41.80	0.42	5,606,017.28	0.011847701	0.028343782
18,372.71	High institutional and social fragility	Tuvalu	113,120	26.30	0.26	29,750.56	0.162418875	0.617556459
2,525,022.25	High institutional and social fragility	Venezuela	283,016,960	33.10	0.33	93,678,613.76	0.008921895	0.036954095
41,309,711.20	High institutional and social fragility	West Bank & Gaza Strip (Palestine)	52,500,720	29.20	0.29	15,330,210.24	0.788840651	2.694660448
50,968,281.56	High institutional and social fragility	Zimbabwe	163,296,370	38.30	0.38	62,507,656.71	0.312295371	0.815392613
280,258,970.23							0.182445187	0.680326601
							Average	

